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DIRECT RESTRAINT ON THE PRESS
Thomas L. Shaffer*
If I were to suggest that the public force be used to silence and hide
sources of information about government as Mr. Cooper's committee,1 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey,' the United States Attorney General,3 and United
States Senator Morse4 have suggested, I could begin with impressive authority. If I
were to suggest nothing at all, as the organized press has done,5 I could begin with
swelling rhetoric on the nature of man. But for my suggestion, direct restraint on
the press, the oniy thing at hand6 is a fable, the story of a crisis that nearly pre-
vented the marriage of the Princess of Ap and the Prince of Upi.
I
It was an arranged marriage, in that the two kingdoms stood to benefit
mutually from the joinder of their royal houses. It was an affair of the heart,
in that the princess was demonstrably fond of the prince and the prince at least
cautiously indifferent. It was a popular marriage; the people of Ap, in whose
land the wedding took place, were sentimental about it. The businessmen among
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 ABA ADVISORY COmm. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRSS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR
T uAL AND FREE PRESS (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited as ABA Rxz.]; The A.B.A.-Free
Press & Fair Trial, Time, Oct. 7, 1966, p. 96.
2 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
3 Address by Attorney General Katzenbach to the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
April 16, 1965, reprinted at Hearings on Fair Trial and Free Press Before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
4 Senator Morse's proposal, S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., would have added the following
as 18 U.S.C. § 1512:
It shall constitute a contempt of court for any employee of the United States, or
for any defendant or his attorney or the agent of either, to furnish or make available
for publication information not already properly filed with the court which might
affect the outcome of any pending criminal litigation, except evidence that has already
been admitted at the trial. Such contempt shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $1,000. Hearings 1.
5 The reaction to the ABA's Report by the American Soc'y of Newspaper Editors is re-
ported in Time, supra note 1, at 98; that of the National Newspaper Ass'n in FoI Digest (pub-
lished by the Freedom of Information Center, University of Missouri), Nov.-Dec., 1966, p. 1,
and in Saturday Review, Dec. 10, 1966, p. 79; and that of the American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n in Saturday Review, Jan. 14, 1967, p. 109, and in a United Press International
dispatch dated Jan. 5, 1967, The South Bend Tribune, Jan. 5, 1967, p. 12, col. 1. See Stanton,
Justice and the News Media, Trial, Dec.-Jan., 1966-67, p. 40. Cf. American Civil Liberties
Union, News Release, Dec. 8, 1966, which gives cautious approval to those parts of the Report
that do not involve direct sanctions on the press. But see the opinions of two prominent
ACLU lawyers, Edward J. Ennis and Melvin L. Wulf, who expressed approval of direct re-
straint. Hearings 347-59, 392-94.
6 Not really the only thing. The Ennis and Wulf statements speak encouragingly about
direct restraint, as do Cowen, Prejudicial Publicity and the Fair Trial: A Comparative Exami-
nation of American, English and Commonwealth Law, 41 IND. L.J. 69 (1965); Jaffe, The
Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, 56 J.
CsRi. L., C. & P.S. 1, 158 (1965); Robbins, The Hauptmann Trial in the Light of English
Criminal Procedure, 21 A.B.A.J. 301 (1935); Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L.
REv. 197 (1963); Note, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 217 (1962); address of Justice Abraham N. Geller, April 30, 1964, reprinted in
Hearings 394-400.
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them even hoped for favorable trade arrangements with their more prosperous
counterparts in the Kingdom of Upi.
Everyone was in favor of the union of the two ruling houses. And everyone
was secretly anxious that the prince, who had never fastened his affections on
any young lady for more than a day and a half, might decide against marriage
at the last minute.
Into this benign tension there came the Ap town crier, a diligent, thorough,
and effective reporter of the news. His objective was information. His inspira-
tion was the right of the people of Ap to know what the wedding gown of the
princess looked like, a piece of information that was more crucial than you
might think. It was an important tradition in Ap - a tradition not without
some religious significance - that brides appear on their wedding days in
dramatic, uninspected, and astonishing finery.
Traditional values aside, there was pragmatic importance centering on the
Prince of Upi. If he learned what the princess was to wear and the state of
her nerves as the wedding approached, he might leave Ap and abandon the
princess. No one in creation was less tolerant of nervous young ladies, and no
one liked less being deprived of a happy surprise.
The union of the two kingdoms was threatened by the town crier's words
out of church as much as - even more than - it would have been threatened
by his trying to convince the prince to jilt the princess." It was a crisis, and to
meet it the King of Ap summoned his council for advice on the problem of
Fair Marriage and Free Crier.'
The king explained to the council that the crier got his information by
climbing a tree (a public tree) and looking into the windows of the palace.
Because of his agility in reaching the window he was able to learn what the
gown looked like and then, the king said, to broadcast throughout the kingdom
this information and that the hands of the princess trembled as she tried on
the gown.
The crier, who was present, told the king there was no crisis. Reporting
the news, he said, was a matter of responsibility and restraint.9 There could
7 Professor Kurland, testifying, quoted Judge Rifkind:
If you or I wrote a little memorandum, I think witness X is a liar and you should
not believe a word he says, and if you or I handed that memorandum on the court-
house steps to a juror, we may be sure that whoever was trying that case would send
for the bailiff to fetch us forthwith before the court where we would be dealt with
summarily. Why should it make a difference that I have a big machine which multi-
plies that memorandum into a million copies and that I have a newsboy deliver it to
the 'jury for me? I don't know, but apparently it does make a difference. Hearings
334.
8 This was a summary conference compared to modern American discussion on a similar
subject, which the Attorney General called "a topic on which lawyers and editors have done
more talking, for a longer time, with less result, than perhaps any other. . . . " Hearings 400.
9 For who responds to whom, see: Editorial, San Bernardino The Daily Sun, Dec. 16,
1964, reprinted in Hearings 293: "When these two principles clash, it is up to the judgment
of news executives as to what course of action to take." Dr. Paul Fisher's reference to the
Columbia Broadcasting System statement to employees, which permits news directors to ignore
network fair-trial guidelines when there are "overriding public policy considerations." Hearings
303. Letter from Everett H. Erlick, American Broadcasting Co., Inc., to Senators Irvin and
Tydings, Aug. 11, 1965, Hearings 452: "[I1t has always been the policy of the American Broad-
casting Co. to limit comment on or discussion of pending litigation within the bounds of fair-
ness and objectivity .... " ABA REP. 180, 241: Every newspaper responding to the ABA ques-
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never be a conflict between Free Crier and Fair Marriage if the problem were
left in his hands. He said he could be trusted to respect the attitudes of the
prince and the ideals of the people, that he would bnly tell a few unprovocative
things about the gown,' ° and that the first step to decadence in any kingdom
was always taken against town criers." Any restriction on a free crier, 2 he said,
including an attempt to restrict the crier's access to information, limited the
right of the people to know'
A cranky legal scholar named Nilgloss spoke after the crier, taking advantage
of the silence that follows references to the freedoms of the people. Nilglosg
began with a question: "Isn't it true, King, that it is a good thing to have our
people fully informed on the marriage of the princess, both because it is uniquely
important to them and because our marriage customs rest ultimately on an
informed public opinion?" The king agreed, and Nilgloss said he thought it
would be best to allow the crier to learn as much as possible about the prepara-
tions for the wedding, so that, after it was over, the people could learn the details
from him and make an informed decision on whether marriage customs should
be changed.
tionnaire said it would seek information from counsel and from police officers even if the
proposed restrictions were adopted. FoI Digest, Nov.-Dec., 1966, p. 3: A four-station radio
code in New York permits nonobservance of fair-trial standards for "overriding public need."
See also Address by Ambassador Goldberg, American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16,
1964, reprinted at Hearings 383-85; statement of Theodore Pierson, General-Counsel of Radio-
Television News Directors Ass'n, to the effect that journalists are without professional discipline,
Hearings 237; Stanton, supra note 5.
10 A homicide case is analyzed in Freedom of Information Center, Fair Trial-Free Press
Case Study, April, 1966; the case involved the death of a student at the University of Missouri.
Consider these quotations:
The Columbia Tribune, the older and larger in circulation of the two papers,
bannered the story eight columns with a large two-line headline reading: "M.U. Fresh-
man Shot to Death; Faculty Member Charged With Murder." .. . [Tihe Tribune ran
six pictures all related to the murder and arraignment on its front page ... . The
Tribune's story was about one and one-half columns ....
Larry Graebner, managing editor of the Tribune, has said, "I know of nothing
available that we did not use, and I know of nothing in the story that we would con-
sider prejudicial to Smith's chance of getting a fair trial." Id. at 3.
It is standard for the organized press to attack the "lawyers' fiction" that pretrial publicity is
prejudicial. See Richard I. Tobin's discussion of the ANPA Report, Saturday Review, Jan. 14,
1967, p. 109. But see the testimony of Dr. Paul Fisher, Hearings 306-09, reporting that the
Freedom of Information Center found, between January 1963 and March 1965, sixty-nine
appeals based on prejudicial pretrial publicity. Three of them had resulted in reversals at the
time of his report.
11 Saturday Review, Dec. 10, 1966, p. 79.
12 See Lyle Wilson's United Press International story on the Kennedy-Manchester book con-
troversy: "[Y]ou or members of your family, could never challenge a free press so boldly as to
make it pause, revise and bow low to a demand for editorial change." South Bend Tribune,
Dec. 28, 1966, p. 24, col. 3.
13 Monroe, A Radio and Television Newsman's View, 11 VILL. L. REv. 687 (1966), part
of Symposium an a Free Press and a Fair Trial, id. 677-741 [hereinafter cited as ViLL.ANOvA
Symaposium]. The legal basis for the "right to know" is apparently found in the dominant
rationale for the first amendment, EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1966), rather than in the "public trial" provisions of the sixth amendment.
United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); Goldfarb, Public In-
formation, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1961); Note, The
Accused's Right to a Public Trial, 42 No=a DAmF. LAWYER 499 (1967). One gets the im-
pression that the legal basis is sometimes ignored in favor of the platitudinous. See FELSHER
& ROSEN, THE PRESS IN THE JURY Box (1966); Louis Nizer says the Press's "Right to Know"
takes second place to the "Rights of the Accused," FoI Digest, Nov.-Dec., 1966, p. 4; Note,
Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know, " 75 HAxv. L. REv. 1199
(1962). The theme is central to the statement of the ANPA, supra notes 5 and 10.
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"Time is the key to that question," the king said. He agreed that the people
had a right to know about the wedding preparations of their princess, but not
if it meant ruining the marriage itself. Nilgloss, who well remembered the days
when weddings in the kingdom were secret, 4 insisted that the health of the
kingdom required open discussion of weddings, and that open discussion as-
sumed adequate and accurate information. Agreeing with the king that the
only question was time, he suggested a two-step solution. First, the crier should
be given access to the wedding preparations. Second, he should be required
to desist from reporting them until the princess had appeared in public on the
day of the wedding."5
The king's other councilors gasped. They could hardly believe that a free
subject of the Kingdom of Ap - and a legal scholar at that - was able so
quickly to forget the lessons of history. One of them reminded the king that
the Nilgloss suggestion was the practice in the Kingdom of Upi, where, as
everyone knew, there was no protection of free expression.' In Upi, he said,
royal officials summarily removed the tongues of criers who prejudiced weddings.'7
There were even cases in which criticism of the officiating priest resulted in
punishment, 8 even for chance slips of the tongue. 9 Another objector agreed:
"This has never been a part of our law,2" and besides it has taken us 165 years
to remove it."'"
14 The immediate response of the American Soc'y of Newspaper Editors was that the ABA
Report threatened "secret law enforcement," Time, supra note 5, at 98. Stanton, supra note 5,
makes that point at length. Similar response was reported from several law enforcement officers,
a prosecutor, and at least two United States circuit judges. Time, Oct. 14, 1966, pp. 72, 74.
15 The reported response of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., past president of the ABA, to the objec-
tions noted ibid., was: "There would not be suppression of news but merely deferment." Ibid.
There is however, an enormous difference between "deferring" access to news sources, which
usually means eliminating them, and deferring publication of a contemporaneously documented
report. See note 39 infra.
16 Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125,
1126 (1964): "[T]nlike the situation in England, freedom of the press is constitutionally pro-
tected here"; Associated Press Guide on Free Press-Fair Trial Debate, March, 1965, quoted in
Hearings 422. Compare these statements with DEVLIN, THE CIMINAL PROSECUTION IN
ENGLAND 79, 116-21, 134 (1958), and Cowen, supra note 6. See generally MAcDERMOTT,
PROTECTION FRoM POWER UNDEa ENGLISH LAW (1957). Cf. People v. Ogilvie, 222 N.E.2d
496 (Ill. 1966).
17 DEVLIN, op. cit supra note 16. Compare the restrictions imposed on the contempt power
of federal courts in the United States by Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966);
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
18 Rex v. Editor of the New Statesman, 44 T.L.R. 301 (K.B. 1928); Rex v. Colsey, THE
Times (London), May 9, 1931, 47 L.Q. REV. 315 (1931). Both are discussed in GOLDFRB,
THE CONTEMPT POWER 84-85 (1963).
19 Regina v. Odham's Press, Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 73; Rex v. Griffiths, [1957] 2 Q.B. 192.
The rule -if that is what it is-was criticized in 73 L.Q. REV. 8, 9 (1957) and 20 MODERN
L. REV. 275 (1957). Cf. Contempt of Court, 207 L.T. 225, 227 (1949). Absolute liability was
eliminated by § 11, Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65; GoLDizARB, op.
cit. supra note 18, at 88. Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48
HARv. L. REV. 885, 906-08 (1935), finds very few instances of punishment for innocent con-
tempt.
20 Wright, supra note 16, at 1126; Monroe, supra note 13, at 691; Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Hearings 386-92. ABA REP. 186 indicates that American newspapers rarely face contempt
citations now, but Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 401, 525 (1928), reported 58 American cases, 15 of them involving jury trial. See
Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 H~Av. L. REv. 161 (1908); Jaffe, supra
note 6.
21 Hearings 411-12 (statement of Professor Donald W. Gillmor). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2045 (Purdon 1962), dating from 1836, provides for direct criminal punishment-as well as
a civil remedy-for publications that "tend to bias the minds . . . of the court . . . jurors,
[Symposium, 19671
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Nilgloss answered that things had never been that bad in Upi.22 Further-
more, he said he did not propose adoption of the Upi practice.13 He did not
propose summary punishment for anything;2" he did not propose closing any-
thing to criers;2" he did not propose punishment for innocent slips of the tongue;'
and he did not propose ever punishing anybody for criticism of priests or of the
institution of marriage. He was interested in only one thing, and that was
keeping the prince on the hook. The question was whether the prince was to
decide on his bride or the town crier was to decide for him.2
On the other hand, Nilgloss said,, the people could hardly be expected
witnesses .... " A bill to provide criminal sanctions in Massachusetts is discussed and repro-
duced in Sigourney, Fair Trial and Free Press-A Proposed Solution, 51 MAss. L.Q. 117
(1966). See Weston v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 175, 77 S.E.2d 405 (1953); Trescher, A Bar
Association View, VLLmAovA SYmPosium 709, 713 n.13; GoLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 91.
22 Freedom of Information Center, British Press Council 1 (1963), reported that "the
British people are the most avid newspaper readers on earth," and attributed restrictions on
freedom of the press more to monopoly than to the law. See ,also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
survey of the English cases in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 921 (1950);
Cowen, supra note 6. Monroe, supra note 13, at 691, quoted with approval the editor of the
Washington Evening Star, who found restrictions on the English press "not easily apparent."
The English rarely complain about restrictions. Goodhart supra note 19, at 909 n.99; Note,
Free Press; Fair Trial-Rights in Collision, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1278 (1959). Even Professor
Gillmor thinks most vocal critics in England have been appeased by the enactment of the Ad-ministration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 11. Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial
in English Law, 22 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 1 (1965).
23 GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 18, at 88-89, believes the most obnoxious aspects of the
British practice are that it is summary, is final, reaches innocent publications, and is used to
protect judicial dignity as well as to keep trials fair. None of these features is necessary to
direct restraint on the press. See the proposals in Jaffe, Will, and Note, all supra note 6, none
of which contains any of these objectionable features.
24 Cowen, supra note 6, argued against it in English practice, as did Beale, supra note
20, half a century ago. Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. Rav. 238
(1909), demonstrated that jury trial was originally used in indirect contempt cases, citing
several cases in the reign of King Edward III. The testimony of Morris A. Shenker, immediate
past president, Nat'l Ass'n of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases, Hearings 329, of Professor
Kurland, Hearings 339, and of Mr. Ennis, Hearings 355, and Note, Controlling Press and
Radio Influence in Trials, 63 HARvARD L. RBV. 840 (1950), discuss jury trials in criminal
contempt cases.
25 See Address by Judge Sobeloff, Nieman Fellows Annual Dinner, Nov. 29, 1955, re-
printed in Hearings 378.
26 Note, Contempt by Publication: The Limitation on Indirect Contempt of Court, 48 VA.
L. Rnv. 556 (1962), and notes 18 and 19 supra.
27 This seems the most onerous part of the English practice. See note 19 supra; Don-
nelly & Goldfarb, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 24 MODERN"I L. REv. 239
(1961). A distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Black in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-
73 (1941), indicates that a contempt citation which is based on insulting a judge in the press
is probably unconstitutional. In re Jameson, 139 Colo. 171, 340 P.2d 423 (1959), 35 Nom
DAM E LAWYER 165 (1959), so held. Goodhart supra note 19 at 900, 901, believed the "scan-
dal of the court" branch of indirect contempt has rarely been punished in England, the most
notable examples being two cases arising out of the Tichborne affair: Onslow and Whalley's
Case, L.R. 9 Q.B. 219 (1873), and Skipworth and Castro's Case, L.R. 9 Q.B. 230 (1873).
Use of the contempt power to protect judges from criticism is no part of the present dis-
cussion, except for the time-honored observation that the Supreme Court of the United States
has yet to pass on jury cases. Some writers, however, talk about the two sides of contempt by
publication as if they were Siamese twins. E.g., Barron, Book Review, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1182.
28 Report of the Advancement Freedom of Information Comm. of Sigma Delta Chi:
American courts of justice belong to the American people, . . . all lawyers are
servants of the court and thereby are servants of the people, and . . . all of their
actions and the actions of the court should be open to the restraint of public opinion
at the time. Hearings 444.
To me this seems to say that the voting public should determine judicial questions any time it
wants to. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren, C. J., concurring), and Richard-
son, Freedom of Expression and the Function of the Courts, 65 HARe. L. REv. 1 (1951),
[Vol. 42:865]
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to decide issues involving marriage if they knew nothing about weddings. 9 For
that reason, the crier should be allowed to learn more, not less, about the wedding
of the princess. °
The other councilors, however, disagreed. The only way to assure proper
and traditional respect for freedom of the crier, they all said, and at the same
time protect the princess from her bridegroom's reluctance was to arrange that
the crier see nothing before the wedding.
Nilgloss suggested that this would lead the crier to broadcast false informa-
tion,"' which might do more harm to the attitudes of the prince than the truth
would. 2 The others answered that it was not part of the council's function to
tell the crier how to run his business."2
Nilgloss suggested that in the long run the people would know far less
if the crier could see nothing. 4 But the others answered that a decent crier would
imply a need to protect judicial decisions from public opinion, even if judges themselves can
never be immune from it.
The efforts of trial counsel in the Speck murder case in Chicago to find a city in Illinois
that had not had its judicial air poisoned by Chicago new media, is described in Time, Jan. 13,
1967, pp. 39, 40. The social price paid for reversed convictions, changes of venue, etc., is
rarely weighed against what might be called the right-to-know- immediately. Phoenix News-
papers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966), is an example. Cowen,
supra note 6, expresses this view.
29 Professor Dowd's introduction to VILLANOVA SYmPosiuM 677, 679:
If the press believes some rule of evidence to be absurd, it has a responsibility to
say so.... The public's right to know is not the right to be fed sensational "facts,"
but rather to be informed as to what is really occurring in the criminal process.
The ANPA Report, supra note 5, at 2: "It is not enough for the people merely to know the
end result of a trial, they need to know the means to that end." Judge Wright, supra note 16,
makes a persuasive case for broad and deep criminal trial coverage in the press, coverage that,
as he emphasizes, involves greater access to information, not less.
30 Cf. Harvard Note, supra note 13, and references therein to "antisecrecy" legislation in
several states - the policy behind which seems directly contrary to the policy behind the sup-
pression-of-sources suggestions cited in note 1 supra, e.g., Judge Smith's testimony in support
of the Morse Bill:
The policy of publicity implicit in the sixth amendment is to protect the accused
and insure a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is obviously superior to the right-to-
know concept. The guarantee of the first amendment cannot be invoked as a basis
for compelling disclosure of information, the publication of which is likely to impair
this right. Hearings 131.
An example of the subtle danger of poor reporting of the judicial process in criminal cases is
that the public, which has read of "evidence" in pretrial reports, feels an injustice is done when
that "evidence" is excluded at the trial, even in cases of hearsay, privilege, or constitutional
objection. Segal, Fair Trial and Free Press: What the General Practitioner Should Know, ABA
Law Notes, Oct., 1966 (Criminal Law Sec.).
31 Testimony of Carlton S. Roeser, Hearings 459-60, covers a case in which pretrial
prejudicial publicity came from a witness whom none of the suggestions for enforced silence
would have touched. Mr. Roeser, who was counsel for defendants in the case, seemed to as-
sume that the Morse Bill would have helped the situation, but it would not have. Neither it
nor the ABA Report, nor the Attorney General's directive, nor the Van Duyne case, keep the
witnesses quiet; and information from witnesses is likely to be less reliable than information
from lawyers or police officers. The ANPA statement, of course, threatened that newsmen
would get "facts" wherever they could be found. The South Bend Tribune, Jan. 5, 1967, p. 12,
col. 1.
32 Foreman, A Defense Attorney's View, VILLANOVA SYmPOSIUm 704, 707:
It is difficult, however, to see how witnesses, their relatives and others can be kept
from discussing the case. . . . In fact, one effect of rules regulating law enforcement
officials and lawyers might be that the only information available to the public is the
least reliable.
33 Senator Javits raised this question with Judge Smith but got no answer. Hearings
147-48.
34 Admiral Dennison of Copley Newspapers said: "[Ijncompetence and dishonesty cherish
a mania for secrecy." Hearings 241. Other critics sharing this view include Ralph Sewell,
president of Sigma Delta Chi, Hearings 272, 423; Robert M. Hutchins, Hearings 282; Donald
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still do his job. They added, without demonstrating what they meant,-5 that
an uninformed or misinformed crier could still make his contribution to the good
of the kingdom.
Nilgloss said that the crier himself would surely prefer postponed publica-
tion to loss of information. The crier's profession, Nilgloss said, was the link
between people and government,"8 the grand department store in the market-
place of ideas. Given a choice between no information and delayed publication,
he thought the crier would prefer delay, especially since delay was not unheard
of among criers"7 and might give an opportunity for fuller, more coherent re-
porting. Surely, he said, unfettered ability to criticize marriage customs and to
report facts, after marriages were beyond the point at which criers could in-
fluence them, was the lion's share of what the people's right to know meant,
if it meant anything."
The crier answered that he disliked both alternatives, especially that of
Nilgloss. It was, he said, the certain destruction of free criers and the right of
the people to know, and therefore much worse than an ignorance that would
not interfere with his freedom. He preferred the proposal of the other councilors.
Feeling bound by the decision of the majority of his council, the king re-
luctantly agreed that the only solution was to arrange matters so the crier could
see nothing. He therefore ordered that the town crier's eyes be put out.
Nilgloss shook his head at the soon-to-be-blind crier and said he could
not understand what was so objectionable about a few days' delay. 9 Another
H. McGannon, president of Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., Hearings 377; and John
Knight of the Miami Herald, who said: "There can be no 'truth in news' if reporters are...
forced to accept a bar association's concept of what should and should not be printed." Hear-
ings 424. Specter, A Prosecutor's View, VILLANOVA SYmPOSIUm 697, itemizes the political
utility of thorough news reporting of criminal cases.
35 The ABA Report exhibits an astonishing ambivalence, alternating between reports that
the press relies almost entirely on statements of lawyers and police officers (114 of 120 reports in
the committee's one-month study of confessions and statements came from police sources, ABA
REP. 28) and assurances that the imposition of silence will not seriously affect the press. The
effects of silence are at one point described as "minimal and perhaps nonexistent," id. at 71; at
another the report forswears direct restraint because it would "stifle desirable discussion . . .
and discourage needed criticism of official conduct." Id. at 151.
36 McKay, An Academic View, VILLANOVA SYMPOsIUM 726, 733, citing Forer, A Free
Press and a Fair Tria, 39 A.B.A.J. 800 (1953).
37 Joseph Nevins, an editor of the Alhambra Post-Advocate, Alhambra, Calif., pointed out
that newspapers routinely delay news on the basis of available space, local interest, and "edi-
torial or publisher 'policy.'" Hearings 255. Senator Ervin said "the rewards and the glory...
go to the man who can make the scoop," Hearings 353, but some newspapers delay crime stories
on advice of counsel, who are in turn influenced by bar association guidelines. Testimony of
Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, Hearings 370-73.
38 Freedom of Information Center, Press Release, Dec. 31, 1966, listed the United States
as having a "free press" rating of 2.71, on a scale ranging from 4 to -4. England, where the
press is supposed to be oppressed, has a rating of 2.37. The Netherlands (3.25), Switzerland
(3.14), Finland (3.05), Norway (2.98), and Sweden (2.77) are all rated higher than the
United States. The rating method is explained in Freedom of Information Center, PICA:
Measuring World Press Freedom, Aug., 1966.
39 Criminal trial delays in the United States range from two months to a year, but most
cases are apparently tried in about four months. The longer delays are often in major cases,
"to allow publicity to dissipate." ABA REP. 238-39. English trials are normally held within
two months of arrest. DxviiN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 101-02. The brevity of restriction on
news sources is one of the arguments in the ABA Report, see note 15 supra, but there is a dif-
ference between postponing publication of a full report that is contemporaneously researched
and closing the sources of information until color and tension - and even interest - is gone.
See ABA REP. 78
Some of Nilgloss's frustration is mirrored in the opinions of Edward J. Ennis, who privately,
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councilor, an erstwhile opponent, suggested that the years Nilgloss had spent
in separation from the tensions of life outside the university made it impossible
for him to understand the subtleties of an open society. "Our society has ex-
pressed a preference for freedom of expression," this councilor said, "recognizing
that other sacrifices may be required. . .. [W]e must acknowledge the . . .
practical consequences." 4 And the crier agreed. "I will be blind," said this
Oedipus of journalism, "but I will be free, and that is what counts."
II
In reference to fair trials the essence of the Nilgloss suggestion is that the
press should see, evaluate, report, and criticize more, not less, about the ad-
ministration of justice. A distinguished federal judge said in 1964:
[T]he public image of justice is distorted because we judges have turned
our backs to the news media and have allowed their writers to draw on
their imaginations instead of reality, and to report only a tiny part, instead
of the rich whole, of the face of justice.41
.
Police interrogation should be open to public scrutiny. The press should
be able to report what arresting officers do, not only what they say they do.4"
It should be able to find out and report what the arrested person knows and how
he uses what he knows.4" If the press had been allowed to do that and had done
it, the Miranda and Escobedo decisions"' might have seemed justified to the
public. On the other hand, they might not have seemed justified, in which case
I think we can depend on the Supreme Court's following the election returns."
The same open access to scrutiny by the press might be applied to such
matters as selective prosecution," the exclusionary rules of evidence,4 7 and ar-
raignment practices, especially in cases arising out of the civil rights movement."
Minutes of the Due Process Committee, ACLU, June 8, 1966, p. 3, and publicly, Hearings 347-
59, has expressed his belief that adoption of the English practice would be less restrictive of the
press than other, more popular suggestions.
40 McKay, supra note, 36, at 728; Wright, supra note 16, at 1129. See note 55 and ac-
companying text infra.
41 Wright, supra note 16, at 1129. See also Stanton, supra note 5.
42 Mr. Nevin's editorial, reprinted in Hearings 283, discussed a case in which newspaper-
men were the unwitting accomplices of misdealing police officers because they took the officers
at their word, which is bad journalism and bad journalism that the law as it stands tends to
encourage. Other examples are in FELSHER & ROSEN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 79-80; Isaacs,
Free Press and Fair Trial, Res Gestae, Nov. 1965, p. 7.
43 ACLU News Release, Dec. 8, 1966, favors the opposite. For instance, the ACLU
would suppress "observations about a defendant's character"; "statements, admissions, confes-
sions or alibis attributed to a defendant"; "reference to investigative procedures, such as finger-
prints, polygraphs, ballistic tests or laboratory tests"; statements about witnesses, evidence, or
argument; and the circumstances surrounding an arrest.
44 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 '(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
45 DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW (Bander ed., 1963).
46 Specter, VILLANOVA SYMPOSiUm 700-01, discusses the uses to which information on
prosecutions might be put by the voters. Cf. DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 16, on selective prose-
cution in England.
47 See the interesting account of the concern taken in the popular press in California when
a routine modernization of the rules of evidence would have affected the reporter's privilege
against disclosing news sources. Hearings 291-93.
48 Time, Oct. 14, 1966, pp. 72, 74, reported reactions of two Southern newspaper editors
to the effect that the ABA Report would hamper the civil rights movement because it would
encourage "secret law enforcement" and protect the "segregationist bully."
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None of the established practices in these areas is sacred; none deserves to be
free from the pressures of public opinion. A column by Robert M. Hutchins in
the Los Angeles Times puts this point in a rhetorical question: "Unless the press
can demand and obtain all the information there is about an individual case,
how can newspapers, television and radio perform the function contemplated by
the first amendment?" ' 9 Existing administrative and judicial secrecy in carrying
out these functions of the Government should be eliminated, not increased. The
unhappy side of the ABA Committee's suggestions to eliminate the sources of
information is that they would increase secrecy where none is necessary. Almost
any secrecy is bad in the processes of criminal justice, which in their way ought to
respond to the people as much as political processes do. I agree with the angry
response to the Morse Bill by the managing editor of the Oklahoma City Times,
Ralph Sewell: "The courts are not private playgrounds for attorneys. They are
public institutes, designed to protect both the rights of the accused and the rights
of each and every citizen."'"
The press has not been reporting enough about the processes of criminal
justice. A principal reason for widespread lack of interest" in due process, the
problem of organized crime,12 and the dilemma of indigent defendants and
prisoners"s is that the public has no information about these things. No real
libertarian can be very happy, therefore, with suggestions that would cut off
existing sources of information.
Those federal judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, as well as leaders of the
press,5" who have voiced objection to the ABA Report and the Morse Bill usually
add that nothing need be done to protect the impartiality of jurors in criminal
cases. I think they are wrong. Obviously something has to be done about
prejudicial publicity. Those who are more interested in the abstract principle
of free expression than the plight of individuals unjustly convicted of crime are
simply beyond my understanding. 5 I feel as Camus did in a similar context:
"[I]f anyone, knowing it, still thinks heroically that one's brother must die rather
than one's principles, I shall go no further than to admire him from a distance
I am not of his stamp." 6
The ritual in which lawyer, judge, and town crier condemn direct re-
straint as a solution to prejudicial publicity because it is "the British system,"
is simplistic, exaggerated, and thoughtless. We might wonder how it is that the
English manage to have a noisy, candid daily press and at the same time pre-
serve a judicial process that is admired by anyone who pauses to comment on it.
49 Los Angeles Times, Feb. 8, 1965, reprinted in Hearings 282.
50 Hearings 423.
51 Consider, by way of analogy, the response to questionnaires sent by the ABA committee:
132 of 200 judges and 146 of 200 defense attorneys did not even reply. ABA REP. 246, 252.
52 See the 1963 predecessor to this symposium, Interstate Organized Crime, 38 NoTRE
DAMn LAWYER 626-759 '(1963).
53 Apathy on all of these questions is not inevitable, of course, as the popular success of
LEwis, GIDEON's TRUMPET (1964), seems to prove.
54 See notes 5 and 14 supra.
55 See note 40 supra. Judge Wright and Professor McKay cannot mean that all of the
price paid for no restraint on the press comes in reversed convictions. There are obvious quan-
tative limits on reversals, even assuming that every convicted person has the means and the
stamina to seek them. What they must mean is that an unjust sentence is a necessary price for
the preservation of a principle.
56 CAMUS, REsIsTANcE, REBELLION AND DEATH 113 '(O'Brien transl. 1961).
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Those who, in terms of the British system, denounce all direct restraint on
the press, also make a fundamental historical mistake. They confuse the gradual
reduction of arbitrary judicial power with a very recent constitutional impulse
to broaden judicial protection for freedom of the press."
Giving several examples in the reign of Edward III,58 Fox demonstrated
that interferences with the administration of justice outside the courtroom were
punished as crimes and tried by indictment early in the history of the common
law. It was in the seventeenth century that out-of-court interferences came to
be punished summarily - without jury trial or appeal or even a right to be
tried before a new judge.59 England has been withdrawing from this excessive
use of judicial power at least since the Law of Libel Amendment Act of 1888,60
and by 1960 most arbitrary aspects of constructive contempt, with a notable
exception in the failure to provide jury trial,6 had been eliminated.
America also reduced judicial power in this area. In fact, as Professor
Chroust has shown,62 there was a general fear of judicial power after our revolu-
tion, a fear that crippled the legal profession for a generation and resulted in
such Jacksonian embellishments as elected judges - even nonlawyer judges -
and the fixing of sentences by juries. Nelles and King's celebrated article' cata-
logued the effect of this American movement on the contempt power; it all
but took the power away. Its effects are echoed in the severe restrictions im-
posed on criminal contempt during the past few Supreme Court terms.64
The effect of this historical strain on contempt as levied against newspaper-
men is seen in the Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig cases,6" and indirectly in
Wood v. Georgia.66 Two conclusions strike me as important for present pur-
poses. One is that the gradual reduction in the contempt power has little to
do with freedom of the press as it bears on the administration of justice. That
issue was only incidentally in those Supreme Court cases. The specific issue of
prejudicial publicity and its effect on jurors was clearly, even expressly, excluded
from what the Court had to say in those opinions, which were part of the Ameri-
can anticontempt tradition. They were only incidentally free speech cases, and
they were not jury cases at all. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court in Wood, and some pointed dicta in Sheppard v. Maxwell,6" are explicit to
that effect.
The other conclusion is that American appellate courts have given almost
no indication of the legitimacy of direct restraint on the press in cases where
57 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 S. Ct. 534
(1967).
58 Fox, supra note 24.
59 GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 18.
60 Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Viet., c. 64, § 3.
61 Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, §§ 11-13.
62 2 CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA, ch. I (1965).
63 Nelles & King, supra note 20.
64 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681
(1964).
65 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). All are discussed in 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 165
(1959).
66 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
67 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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prejudicial pretrial publicity posed a clear and present danger to the administra-
tion of justice. There is literally no indication of the legitimacy where the direct
restraint is based, not on the contempt power, but on the general power of the
state, and the specific power of its legislative branch, to protect judicial institu-
tions from illegitimate influence.
III
What I propose is a statute that would make the premature publication
of certain kinds of prejudicial information a crime. Such a statute has been
in force in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for 131 years, with parallels in
Canada, Australia, and Northern Ireland.e5 It is an ordinary criminal statute,
not dependent upon the contempt power.69 Modem and specific proposals have
been published by Miss Jaffe of the Illinois Bar,7" Mr. Sigourney of the Mas-
sachusetts Bar,71 and United States District Judge Hubert L. Will.72
The statute should be restricted in its operation to criminal cases, during the
time between arrest and verdict, and only to those in which a jury trial is either
used or would have been used but for the prejudicial publicity. s Its validity
would turn on a finding of clear and present danger to the administration of
justice. That finding might be a legislative finding for specific kinds of publicity; 4
it might be a more general legislative finding, followed by a jury determination
on clear and present danger in each case brought under the statute.
Specific offenses that the statute might define include: the premature
publication of the defendant's pretrial statements; description of his criminal
record; description of tangible evidence seized by the police;75 statements of wit-
nesses, 6 including testimony in preliminary hearings; "7 and the contents of pro-
ceedings held during the trial but out of the presence of the jury.
The legislative findings on which the statute might rest could be general,
68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2045 (Purdon 1962); Morton, Prejudicial News Reporting of
Criminal Trials in the British Commonwealth, Hearings 750-58, 754, describes commonwealth
legislation. See also SiGouRNEY, op. cit. supra note 21; Cowen, Prejudicial Publicity and the
Fair Trial: A Comparative Examination of American, English and Commonwealth Law, 41
IND. L.J. 69 (1965); Trescher, op. cit. supra note 21.
69 Commonwealth v. Conroy, 69 Pitts. Leg. J. 373 (Quart. Sess. Clearfield County 1920).
70 Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News Reporting in Crim-
inal Cases, 56 J. Cram. L., C. & P.S. 1, 166-69 '(1965). See also Note, The Case Against Trial
by Newspaper, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 217 (1963).
71 SIGOURNEY, op. cit. supra note 21.
72 Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 197 (1963).
73 Note, supra note 70 at 246, discusses the amendments that might be required to bring
such a statute into line with statutes giving reporters a privilege not to disclose their sources.
74 Donnelly & Goldfarb, supra note 27, at 255; Will, supra note 72, at 214-16.
75 The ABA Report suggests no remedy for tbis sort of publication, although most com-
mentators do. The committee was obviously led into this gap by its refusal to impose signifi-
cant direct sanctions for pretrial prejudicial publicity; one reason expressed against a remedy
is that evidence is often seized in the presence of reporters. ABA REP. 90.
76 Neither the ABA Report, the Morse Bill, the Attorney General's Address, nor State v.
Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), suggest any way to protect against this sort
of prejudice. See notes 31 and 32 supra.
77 English magistrates may sit in camera, but rarely do unless the accused requests it. The
experience there on preliminary hearings is almost exactly as that in America: the press is free
to report what occurs, which is often a substantial amount of information, especially when the
defense elects to try for a dismissal. See DnvLiN, T E CRImNAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND
107-11, 116-21 '(1958). An interesting study of the tactics involved is in C. P. SNOW,
STRA NERS AND BROTheRS, chs. 27-29 (1960).
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and could be coupled with a general description of the offense. This is the form
of the Pennsylvania statute."8 The legislature, if the statute took this form, would
be finding that conduct within the general formula is capable of prejudicing
jurors; it would be up to the jury in the prosecution under the statute to de-
termine whether it had a prejudicial tendency.
Accusations against persons under this statute would be brought under
routine local criminal processes, would be triable by a jury, and would be as
appealable as any other conviction. Sanctions would have to be available against
both corporate employers and natural employees, and should perhaps parallel
those that in recent years have promised to be effective in federal antitrust actions.
This statute would be much more effective, and much less drastic, than the
proposals of the ABA Committee. It should be accompanied by broadened access
to records and hearing in criminal cases; by opportunities for the press to observe
arrest and interrogation procedures; and by exposure to parties, counsel, and
police officers, unfettered by any official rules.
The use of sanctions against persons who poison jurors with prejudiced
publicity is not radical. A good deal of precedent exists for it in the present
practice of trial judges,79 in the early American cases,"0 in the Commonwealth
nations that deal with the problem by statute,8 ' in a recent conviction of a re-
porter who intercepted and then used police radio transmissions in violation of the
Federal Communications Act, 2 in state contempt citations against reporters
that somehow survived despite the predictions that they never would," and
even in two significant parts of the ABA Report: that imposing contempt
sanctions against police employees,8" and that employing contempt against re-
porters who publish accounts of proceedings held out of the jury's presence. 8
The statute would not invoke prior restraint; it would correct what the Chief
Justice, in the last word on the subject from the Supreme Court of the United
States, called "a substantive evil actually designed to impede the course of
justice."88
78 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2045 (Purdon 1962).
79 Fol Digest, Nov.-Dec., 1966, reports current examples in Indiana, p. 2 (press limited to
matters presented to jury); Florida, p. 3, '(radio broadcasters prohibited from using "back-
ground information" during the trial) ; and North Carolina, p. 3, (restrictions on news sources).
Judge Hamilton M. Hobgood of North Carolina is quoted, at Hearings 483, as restraining re-
porters from printing matters not in evidence. Trial-judge practice does not, of course, include
restraints the news media impose upon themselves for commercial reasons. See note 37, supra.
80 See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUm. L. REv.
401, 525 (1928).
81 See note 68 supra.
82 United States v. Fuller, 202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
83 See Goss v. Illinois, 204 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.
1963); Brumfield v. State, 108 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1959); People v. Goss, 20 Ill. 2d 224, 170
N.E.2d 113 (1960), cert. den. 365 U.S. 881 (1961); People v. Goss, 10 Ill. 2d 533, 141
N.E.2d 385 (1957); Weston v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 175, 77 S.E.2d 405 (1953). See also
United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 368 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1966). Contra, Phoenix News-
papers v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966).
84 ABA REP. 5-8, which is meant to reach administrative officers, examining physicians, and
employees of administrative agencies. Id. at 102, 107. The committee finds authority for direct
restraint in FED. R. Cram. P. 5(a), which requires police officers to offer arrested persons for
prompt arraignment, and in United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906), where contempt was
held to lie against a local sheriff for interference with the federal courts.
85 ABA RlP. 14-15, 152-53, justification for which is held to be implied in Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
86 Wood v. Georgia, supra note 85, at 389. See Foreman, VILLANOVA SYMPOSiUM 704.
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The direct restraint part of this proposal is not radical, although the positive
part of it is. The idea that news sources should be opened and the press en-
couraged to probe police and judicial practices, that the press should say more,
not less, about the administration of justice is a radical idea."
My proposal is somewhat unusual, too, in the role juries would play in
imposing direct restraint. In the first place, the statute would accept Mr. Justice
Black's invitation in the Bridges opinion for a state legislative finding that certain
common reporting practices pose a clear and present danger of interference with
the administration of justice in criminal cases tried to juries." This legislative
finding of fact would have significant weight in a constitutional challenge to the
statute, 9 as a similar congressional finding might have in determining the con-
stitutionality of antisubversive legislation.9" The Supreme Court, in view of
Estes v. Texas9 and the line of cases culminating in Sheppard v. Maxwell,92
could hardly quibble with its reasonableness.
In the case against the publisher, the statute would leave a general issue of
prejudicial impact to the jury. If the statute were divided into two offenses,
as judge Will suggests, the jury's task would be simple where the publisher was
accused of violating a specific statutory prohibition, such as publishing a report of
the defendant's statement before the trial. In that case the factual finding of
prejudice would already have been made by the legislature.
The jury's role would be more crucial where the accusation was under the
statute's general prohibition; Judge Will's phrase is "serious and imminent danger
of substantial prejudice to the fair administration of criminal justice." 3 In this
latter category - and perhaps all proceedings ought to be in this category9 -
the jury's role would be similar to what it is in determining whether publicationg
are obscene.9" All the factors involved in the premature publication - the
pendency of the proceedings, the probability of impartiality in the jurors who
Chief Justice Warren's opinion suggests that "actually designed" means proof of intent to ob-
struct justice is required, and the ABA Report obviously took that suggestion at face value.
However, intent ought to be a question of impact on the jury, not of an evil heart. Judgment
as to impact is a daily part of the trial judge's life. Shaffer, Bullets, Bad Florins and Old, Boots,
39 NoTRE DAMna LAWYER 20 (1963). The constitutional implications of a crime of this nature
which does not involve proof of an evil heart are discussed in Richardson, Freedom of Expres-
sion and the Function of the Courts, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1951).
87 One advantage of contempt that is lost or reduced in a statute is flexibility. Relief from
statutory restrictions where justice requires it is easily accomplished in England. E.g., Good-
hart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARv. L. REV. 885, 893-98
(1935). One answer might be a provision for judicial relief from the statute in some cases.
See Haimbaugh, Free Press Versus Fair Trial: The Contribution of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 26
U. PiTT. L. REV. 491 (1965).
88 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1941); Le Wine, What Constitutes Preju-
dicial Publicity in Pending Cases, 51 A.B.A.J. 942 '(1965).
89 Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influences in Trials, 63 HAV. L. REv. 840, 851
(1950). See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Will, supra note 72, at 214-16.
90 See Richardson, supra note 86, at 32-33, 37.
91 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
92 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
93 Will, supra note 72, at 215.
94 This would limit the legislative finding to a general determination that pretrial publicity
posed a possibility of clear and present danger to the administration of justice, and leave it to
the jury to determine the necessary causal relation.
95. O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio; 40
NoTRn DAM LAWYER 1 '(1964).
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were exposed to prejudice, and the intensity and dissemination of the publicity 6
- would enter into the jury's determination. Much of the factual determination
of whether the publication at issue posed a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration of justice would thus become a question for the jury, whose verdict
would be open to the same appellate review accorded other verdicts, but no more
than that. This would be a case of one jury deciding, concerning another jury,
what was prejudicial in effect, and what was not. Prejudice among jurors is
usually decided by judges, but they axe really not very good at it." A second
jury would be better able to tell what the impact of prejudice was likely to have
been. I do not propose to punish publications that are not found to have been
prejudicial, either by a general legislative finding of fact or by a jury determina-
tion." I do not propose ever punishing anybody for criticism of judges or publicity
in cases where a jury trial is not available, as it would not be, for instance, after
the defendant or both the defendant and the state waive jury trial.
Intent of the person making the publication would be relevant only to the
extent that it bore on the impact the publication had,99 which should take care
of any possibility of prosecution for purely innocent publications. An alternative
provision, such as England now has,' could expressly bar liability for purely
innocent publication. Selective prosecution and the well-known propensity of
jurors to make their own law might also help in this respect.
IV
I do not believe that direct restraint would seriously limit freedom of the
press if it were imposed within these limitations. It depends, I suppose, on what
one means by a free press. If that phrase means news media having wide access
to the details of what the Government does, and the fullest freedom to report
what it learns to the people, as Mr. Hutchins' question suggested, then what
I suggest would produce more freedom, not less. It would be better than what
Mr. Cooper's committee suggests; by any standard, the ABA Report would
produce less freedom, less accuracy, less detail - far less, in other words, that
would respond to the people's "right to know."
These temporary restraints, coupled with fuller information than the press
has ever had, should play a very minor role in the total assessment of free expres-
sion in the news media."0 Certainly in England, where restraints of this nature
are more severe than what I am suggesting, and where access to information
is more limited than I think it should be, the total effect on a free press is
obviously minor. It appears, in fact, that the tendency to monopoly ownership
96 See Haimbaugh, supra note 87.
97 Shaffer, Appellate Courts and Prejudiced Verdicts, 26 U. PITT L. RaV. 1 (1964).
98 See Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WAsir. & LEE REv. 1 (1965),
quoting Queen v. Payne, [1896] 1 Q.B. 577; Haimbaugh, supra note 87.
99 Richardson, supra note 86, at 13-16.
100 Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 11, discussed in Goldfarb,
T E CONTEMPT POWER 88 (1963).
101 See note 38 supra on criteria used by the Freedom of Information Center in measuring
that elusive value.
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of newspapers there - and here too perhaps - is a far more dangerous inhibi-
tion on a free press than anything the courts do." 2
On the whole, it seems to me that the Kingdom of Ap would have been
better off if the crier had been allowed to see whatever he wanted to see, within
limitations imposed by the modesty of the princess, of course, and then had been
told to keep it under his hat for a day or two.
Afterthoughts
The admirable decision to open discussion in this Symposium to the dis-
tinguished judges, television and newspaper executives, lawyers, and law pro-
fessors who were present produced enough constructive reaction to my proposals
that a short appendix might be helpful.
Professor Force, Judge Beamer, and Judge Grant - along with such
thoughtful observers from the news media as Mr. Mitgang and Mr. Conklin -
brought the discussion, again and again, to a single point: some form of direct
restraint is probably necessary to any effective protection for the fairness of
criminal trials. A principal and recurrent criticism of the ABA proposals was
that they do not involve enough direct restraint to make them workable.
In my view, statutory direct restraint makes obvious improvements in the
use of the contempt power; they are adequately discussed above. But the greatest
obstacle to statutory direct restraint, and this, too, arose repeatedly in the dis-
cussion, is practical politics, practical politics on two levels.
The first level is the legislature. Many participants thought it unlikely that
legislatures would pass the sort of bill Judge Will, Mr. Sigourney, and Miss Jaffe
have proposed. Against that objection one might set the substantial amount
of legislation in this country on the contempt power and the serious consideration
given Senator Morse's bill in the Senate. But it seems to me that a more sensible
response to the objection is that intelligent men making a reasonable suggestion
must assume that legislators will take it seriously. And, if one must be brutal,
legislators will begin to take this problem seriously as the reversed convictions that
turn on prejudicial publicity begin to pile up. And pile up they surely will in
the next several years.
The second level of practical politics is enforcement. The suggestion was
made that elected prosecutors and elected judges would not enforce this sort
of statute. When later I accused the distinguished federal judge who made that
point of cynicism, he accused me of youth. But youth or not, I still believe his
observation was cynical. Most people in the United States obey the law (the
most unpopular statute in the nation - the Internal Revenue Code - is also
the statute that depends more than any other on voluntary citizen compliance);
I see no reason to believe that citizens who happen to be news reporters will
not obey the law. I assume, therefore, that enforcement problems will arise only
for an irresponsible minority. From the responsible newspaperman's point of
view, a statutory system for calling the irresponsible to book would provide a
sanction where now there is literally none; and it would thereby leave the
102 Freedom of Information Center, British Press Council, March, 1963.
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responsible newspaperman free of the irritation of irresponsible competition. I
do not think that kind of relief would fill him with resentment against judges
and prosecutors.
Nor will prosecutors ignore their obligations, nor will judges refuse to apply
the statutory remedy when prosecutors seek to have it applied. The legislative
finding on which my proposal rests points as much in the direction of the re-
newed trial-judge control the Sheppard opinion demands as it does toward the
constitutional requirement the Bridges opinion invites.
It is mildly ironic that what is demanded of trial judges in enforcing direct
restraint is exactly what the Supreme Court demanded of trial judges in the
Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig opinions. The Court there insisted, repeatedly,
that elected state trial judges have the courage to resist the press when the press
criticizes them. The legislature, imposing a system of direct restraint, would
be asking for exactly that sort of judicial courage in providing a criminal remedy
against irresponsible news reporters.
